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‘Loser’s History’:
Legitimacy, History Politics and
Ideological reforms in
the Soviet Union 
 AAPPO KÄHÖNEN
As research of any historical topic, research on the Soviet society and, 
even more so, the political system, is unavoidably infl uenced by the 
present day in many ways. The ending of Cold War Era with the defeat 
of the Soviet Union has unavoidably changed the perspective on that 
period. All the decisions made by, or on behalf of, the Soviet side are 
easily seen as falling in the category of ‘loser’s history’, to be explained 
away or condemned. On the other hand, as all historical research is 
based on hindsight, recognising the result of a historical process does not 
automatically commit one to the ‘winner’s history’, which justifi es the 
actual outcome of the process, and only that. 
On a most general level the theme of this article is based on the relation 
between policy making and ideology. On a second, more practical level, 
this article examines the role of ideology and history in legitimating the 
political system of the Soviet Union, which was characterised by one-
party rule, and the open role of ideology. Here it becomes essential to 
keep in mind the old dual meaning of ‘history’ both as the events and 
the processes of the past, and as a discipline offering representations of 
those past events.   
In trying to understand the interdependence between political system, 
ideology and history in the Soviet Union the following questions serve 
as a starting point: Which new conditions did de-Stalinisation set for 
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legitimating the Soviet political system and Soviet history? Which 
historical and ideological arguments were used for legitimating the 
radical social and political reform programme, the perestroika? Did the 
practises used during these reform periods differ from the earlier use of 
ideology and history as a means of legitimating the existing order?      
Soviet domestic and foreign policy from the 1930s to the 1980s offers 
cases through which to clarify the connection of historical interpretations 
and ideology with policy formation and the legitimating of the political 
system. First, it is informative to observe how history had been used to 
justify the emergence and stabilization of the new political system.
STABILIZATION OF THE REGIME: THE SHORT COURSE TO POWER
For the ‘Bible’ of the Soviet history, The History of the CPSU (b): 
Short Study Course (1949, orig. 1938), some of the central tools of 
argumentation were, perhaps surprisingly, omission and labelling. The 
direct personality cult of  Stalin was somewhat less obvious, unless the 
words ‘party’, ‘central committee’ and ‘party organs’, especially after the 
death of  Lenin, are understood to equate with ‘Stalin’.1 These collective 
institutions of power seemed to refl ect his views remarkably well in the 
textbook, specifi cally when it came to intra-party opposition. This is no 
wonder, since in practise Stalin was the real editor and partly even writer 
of the book, despite the pseudonym ‘the editorial board set by the CPSU’, 
mentioned in the front leaf.2 
1 See, for example, descriptions related to the preparation and implementation of 
collectivization in agriculture during 1928–1930, Neuvostoliiton kommunistisen 
puolueen (bolshevikkien) historia: Lyhyt oppikurssi, toim. Neuvostoliiton 
kommunistisen puolueen keskuskomitean asettama toimituskunta. [History of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Study Course, 
editorial board set by the Central Committee of CPSU, no individual names 
given]. Petroskoi: Karjalais-suomalaisen SNT:n valtion kustannusliike 1949, 
326–334, 339–349. However, ‘comrade Stalin ‘could be mentioned four times 
on a page, when his role needed to be underlined, for example, in relation to 
industrialization policy, 322. 
2 R. Tucker on the creation and context of the ‘Short Study Course’ in Stalin 
in Power: Revolution from Above, 1928–1941. New York: W. W.  Norton & 
Company 1992, 530–550.
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Though omission and outright slander is used repeatedly in relation to 
the political opponents, the most important case of omission is connected 
to the Bolshevik party’s rise to power in 1917. When the emperor had 
been forced to abdicate as a consequence of the February Revolution 
and the provisional government had assumed power, the political climate 
became remarkably more liberal, despite the continuing First World War. 
The Bolshevik party, together with many other revolutionary groups, was 
allowed to emerge from underground and to organise openly. However, 
initially the Bolshevik party had no clear policy to follow under the new 
circumstances. The party was divided over the question of the revolution’s 
prospects: should Russia fi rst develop into a bourgeois democracy under 
the new provisional government, or should it proceed immediately 
towards a socialist revolution. According to the Short Study Course:
 Kamenev, and some other members of [the party’s] Moscow 
organisation, i. e.  Rykov,  Bubnov and  Nogin, had a semi-
menshevist stance, supporting conditionally the provisional 
government and policy of ‘defending fatherland’. [However], 
‘… Stalin,  Molotov and others together with the majority of 
the party defended policy of distrust towards the provisional 
government… 
This division existed, but actually Stalin’s views published in Pravda 
and Izvestya in the spring of 1917 were clearly moderate and supported 
a defensive war against Germany, whereas young Molotov supported a 
more radical line. Here the exclusion of Stalin from the fi rst group, and 
inclusion in the second means that as a tool omission is combined with 
outright misrepresentation of the facts.3  
The arrival of the party’s leader, Lenin, in Russia solved that confl ict, 
as he favoured the fast approach. This is the information the Short Study 
Course offers to the student:
The absence of the party’s leader – Lenin – was felt. On April 3 
(16) 1917, after a long lasting exile, Lenin returned to Russia. 
3 Lyhyt oppikurssi [Short Study Course], 204–205. Compare to T. Polvinen, 
Venäjän Vallankumous ja Suomi, vol. 1. Porvoo: WSOY 1967 40–41, on the 
basis of Pravda 5/18 Mar. 1917, 14/27.1917, 21 Mar. /4. Apr.1917. The double 
dates show the difference (13 days) between the Julian calendar, used in pre-
revolutionary Russia, and the more generally used Gregorian calendar.  
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Lenin’s return had immense signifi cance for the party and the 
revolution. In Switzerland, immediately after receiving the fi rst 
information on the revolution, Lenin wrote to the party and the 
Russian working class in ‘Letters from afar’: …Lenin arrived to 
Petrograd on the night of 3 April.4   
This is all that is ever told about  Lenin’s return to Russia from Switzerland. 
On the basis of geographical conditions alone some questions arise. 
What route did Lenin take in returning to Russia? Why is this deemed 
completely irrelevant, as though he would have been ‘beamed up’ 
directly from the Swiss Alps to the Petrograd railway station? However, 
the omission of even a brief description is far from accidental, and has 
remarkable signifi cance from the viewpoint of legitimacy for the regime, 
which was established later in early November 1917.
The answer to this problem is not self-evident, as neutral Switzerland 
was surrounded by the countries taking part in the First World War, some 
of which were fi ghting on the same side as Russia, while others were 
fi ghting against it. The shortest and most rational route to Russia went 
through Germany, against which Russia was at war. Even if crossing the 
front line was out of the question, the crossing of German territory was 
required to reach neutral Sweden, from where it would be possible to cross 
the Russian border. Lenin’s supporters were able to arrange such a route, 
with the acceptance of German offi cials, in a sealed train compartment, 
and he made the trip with other emigrant Russian revolutionaries, mainly 
Mensheviks. This much Lenin himself had been ready to publish at the 
time, simultaneously in Pravda and Izvestya on 18 April 1917, though 
he readily gave credit for the idea to the Mensheviks. Even this version, 
public at the time, is completely omitted from the Short study course.5
This becomes more understandable when it is taken into account that 
the Bolshevik connection to Germany was not merely geographical, but 
also fi scal, though in an indirect way, and some doubts connected to this 
sur faced before the Bolshevik rise to power. The point is not so much 
how truthful or accurate the doubts were, but how the Bolsheviks reacted 
to them, fi rst immediately, and later through historical presentations, and 
why. 
4 Lyhyt oppikurssi [Short Study Course], 204–205.
5 D. Volkogonov, Lenin: Life and legacy. Glasgow: HarperCollins 1995, 120. 
Compare to the Short Study Course, 204–205.
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The case of the ‘German connection’ regarding the Bolshevik party 
can be briefl y explored through two individuals,  A. L. Helphand, also 
known as  Parvus, and Y. A. Fürstenberg, also known as  Ganetsky. 
Both these men, but especially Parvus, were important middlemen in 
the indirect relation between the Bolsheviks and imperial German 
offi cials, specifi cally after 1915. Parvus had met  Lenin and a number of 
other revolutionary emigrants, as well as German socialists, including 
 Plekhanov,  Axelrod, and  Kautsky in Western Europe before the 1905 
Russian revolution. He, like  Trotsky, also had signifi cant role in the 
fi eld, organising the revolutionary action of 1905, which after Russian 
defeats in the war against Japan shook the foundations of the autocratic 
monarchy. However, after 1905 Parvus became more prominent in 
writing successful theatre plays and in business enterprises. In January 
1915 he had established contacts with German offi cials through the 
German embassy in Constantinople, Turkey, and during the same year the 
German Foreign Ministry prepared to increase considerably, by several 
million marks, the fi nancing of revolutionary propaganda in Russia. 
Since the beginning of hostilities between Russia and Germany in 1914, 
German war aims had included the weakening of Russia by supporting 
national separatism in the multinational empire, as well as by supporting 
a revolution in Russia, and thus ruining its fi ghting capabilities. On the 
basis of his Constantinople contact, Parvus was able to sell the Germans 
the idea of helping the return of Russian revolutionaries to Russia after 
the 1917 February revolution. The idea was also introduced to, and 
accepted by, the German High Command and the emperor.      
The second interesting step in this indirect relation is that after the 
February revolution in 1917 the Bolshevik publications had been greatly 
increased, so that in July 1917 the Bolsheviks ran 41 newspapers. The 
seven biggest had a total circulation of 320 000, of which Pravda alone 
included 90 000 daily copies. The party could also afford to buy printing 
machines and pay, though not on a continuous basis, salaries to its 
permanent functionaries. It would be surprising if membership fees, even 
in a growing party, would have been enough for all that.6
The third step is formed by the investigations of the Bolsheviks’ 
opponents, the provisional government, after July 1917, when the party 
had been momentarily defeated in street demonstrations in the capitol, 
6 Volkogonov, Lenin: Life and legacy , 110–113, 118, 123.
Aappo Kähönen
134
St. Petersburg. The provisional government, and later  Kerensky as its 
former head, can be regarded partly as witnesses in their own case, when 
they charged the Bolsheviks of treason on basis of wartime co-operation 
with the Germans. However, the legal investigation, which was never 
fi nished, brought up interesting reactions to these charges, as well as some 
facts. The investigation, on the one hand, had been able to prove that 
 Parvus’ and  Ganetsky’s business enterprises were a front, through which 
money had been directed from German banks to Bolshevik supporters in 
St. Petersburg who, however, were not members of the party. As early 
as the spring and summer 1917 the money transferred was believed to 
amount to 2 million German marks.
 Lenin, though hiding from the provisional government, reacted 
through the Bolshevik papers with a vehement and uncompromising 
denial of the charges presented. As the money transfers apparently could 
not be denied, he claimed that Parvus and Ganetsky were not Bolsheviks 
at all, and that he had no contact with them whatsoever. Regarding 
Parvus, this was formally true, as he was member of the nationalist-
minded Polish socialist party, but Ganetsky had been a party member 
almost from the beginning, as it later came out, when he was interrogated 
and executed during  Stalin’s purges 20 years later. At present, as Lenin’s 
correspondence after collapse of the Soviet Union has become available 
for researchers, a link between him and Parvus can be easily established. 
Their correspondence did deal with fi nancial themes, though it did not 
directly mention German money. In spring 1917, the volume of this 
correspondence surpassed that of Lenin and  Inessa Armand, Lenin’s 
mistress, so Parvus was not a complete stranger to Lenin. As a last step 
in the case of ‘the German connection’, promptly organised Bolshevik 
secret police VtchK (‘tcheka’) destroyed the material produced by the 
provisional government’s investigation on 16 November 1917, very soon 
after the Bolshevik rise to power.7
This description needs to be located in the context formed by the 
Short Study Course. The point here is not, as provisional government 
would have wanted, to prove that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were agents 
bought by German money, but instead the denial of the whole ‘German 
connection’, fi rst actively by Lenin, and then passively, through omission, 
by Stalin in the canonised history interpretation. The Bolsheviks were 
7 Volkogonov, Lenin: Life and legacy, 116–122.
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genuinely a very internationalist, or world revolutionary party. On this 
basis they could argue, coherently, that their only common interest with 
Imperial Germany was in the collapse of the Russian Empire, and in 
such a case, there was no reason not to accept German support, even 
fi scal, towards that end in 1915–1917. However, here the ideological and 
legitimating aspects of historical interpretations come into play.  Lenin’s 
responses show, that the Bolshevik party felt vulnerable to accusations 
based on deceiving the nation. When the new regime had consolidated its 
foundations and was canonising its past in the mid 1930s, it could admit 
even less the acceptance of fi nances from the enemy of the ‘Motherland’ 
(Rus. Rodina). This clearly points to the growing signifi cance of 
nationalist legitimacy, despite the offi cially claimed internationalism in 
Marxist-Leninist ideology.  
REFORMING IDEOLOGY AND WEAKENING LEGITIMACY:
DIVISIONS IN THE PARTY AND ITS ELITE 
The political system of the Soviet Union changed after the death of  Stalin 
in 1953 roughly from a totalitarian to a more pluralistic model, run by 
different bureaucratic interest groups within the party-state. Different 
levels of party bureaucracy, various branches of state administration, the 
army and the security apparatus have all been identifi ed as examples of 
such interest groups. Despite the changes that took place it was crucial 
that the basis of the one-party system was never questioned.8 When 
discussing policy-making in this article the Marxist-Leninist ideology is 
mostly understood as a structure of political communication offering a 
common vocabulary, arguments, and shared values. Even though political 
decisions were formulated and justifi ed by the ideology, the political 
elite was not free to speak or act in whatever way it liked. Regardless of 
whether the only offi cial ideology was believed in or not, its canonised 
8 V. P. Naumov, ‘Vvedenie’ [Introduction], in N. V. Kovaleva, A. V. Korotkov, 
S. A. Meltshin, Ju. V. Sigathev, A. S. Stepanov  (eds), Molotov, Malenkov, 
Kaganovitch 1957. Dokumenty. Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi fond ‘Demokratija’, 
1998 , 9.
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language limited the observation of problems and the solutions to them,9 
thus setting ‘the limits of the possible.’ 
The single most important process that affected the legitimacy of the 
Soviet system was de-Stalinisation, announced by the general secretary 
of the CPSU,  Nikita Khrushchev, at the XX Party Congress in February 
1956. The actual speech held in the congress by Khrushchev remained 
secret in the USSR, but was soon leaked abroad. De-Stalinisation can 
best be understood as an attempt to deal with  Stalin’s legacy, mostly in 
relation to the party, as well as a weapon in the internal power struggle 
between his successors. However, in a one-party state it proved diffi cult 
to limit criticism to the ‘cult of personality,’ to the former leader, without 
at least implicitly questioning the legitimacy of the political system 
which had allowed him to rise to and consolidate his power.10 This 
fundamental ideological shift had profound consequences not only for 
the Soviet society, but also for international relations. With the loss of 
the aura of ideological infallibility, the USSR’s leadership in the socialist 
world could be questioned in a totally different manner than before. This 
questioning came from both within and beyond the bloc of socialist 
countries.       
THE SOVIET OPINION
The Soviet political elite, including the top as well as the local party 
leadership, soon noticed the dangerous and unexpected consequences of 
the XX Party Congress. The intelligentsia increasingly went beyond the 
criticism of Stalin, interpreting de-Stalinisation as a call for creative liberty. 
In addition to non-party members of the intelligentsia, even members of 
the party demanded, at the local party meetings in March 1956,that those 
responsible for mass terror should be punished. Only about a month later, 
in early April, the CPSU Central Committee sent a letter to members of 
the party warning about ‘unhealthy criticism.’ The letter, published in 
9 C. Pursiainen, Beyond Sovietology: International Relations Theory and the 
Study of Soviet/Russian Foreign and Security Policy. Helsinki: The Finnish 
Institute for International Affairs 1998, 80–83 on the basis of Joseph Schull and 
Robert G. Herman.
10 Naumov, ‘Vvedenie’ [Introduction], 9–11
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Pravda, called for a ‘struggle against demagogues and rotten elements, 
who try to use the cover of criticizing the personality cult to criticize the 
Party line.’ These kinds of seeds of a civil society seemed to continue 
troubling the leadership during the summer, as a similar letter had to be 
sent in July. Limited action was also taken against the troublemakers.
The real turning point, however, in the position of the Central 
Committee emerged in November-December, in the form of ‘the 
Hungarian Syndrome’. The crisis in Hungary brought the Party’s fear of 
losing power into the open, which, it was thought, might happen if the 
Party’s total control over the political sphere was even slightly eased. 
The letter sent to local party organizations by the Central Committee now 
spoke about the dictatorship of the proletariat, which ‘in relation to anti-
Soviet elements should be used without pity.’ The letter was followed 
by a wave of arrests and very severe court sentences. As early as the 
fi rst months of 1957 a couple hundred persons, both party members and 
non-party, were sentenced because of ‘lies concerning Soviet reality’ and 
‘revisionism.’11 
A few examples of the letters from the ‘rank and fi le’ of the Central 
Committee and the Politburo members illustrate the changing mood. 
Reactions towards de-Stalinization, and the denunciation of the cult of 
personality are divided, but a majority of the writers seem to think that 
the adversary, the West, had gained new weapons. 
 Petrosgin, an engineer, in his letter of 25 January 1957 still criticized 
 Khrushchev for making too weak a commitment concerning de-
Stalinization. Specifi cally he was troubled by inconsistencies in the 
statements made by the First Secretary when he visited the Chinese 
embassy in Moscow. He began to think, ‘that there are two N. S. 
Khrushchevs, the fi rst fi ghting with all the Leninist commitment and 
directness against  Stalin’s cult of personality,’ the other in the embassy 
‘defending those criminal actions committed by Stalin, made against the 
people during his 20-year personal dictatorship.’ In conclusion Petrosgin 
observes that the presentations of Khrushchev have created ‘misgivings 
and doubts about the fact that Stalin’s cult of personality will be eliminated 
from our country.’12  
11 Naumov, ‘Vvedenie’ [Introduction], 11–12
12 Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi arhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI), Petrosgin’s letter 
to the Central Committee of the CPSU, 25 Jan. 1957, 5/30/19.
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The letters arriving in mid April have another, altogether different 
tone.  Antonina Mikhailova Peterson, a member of the party since 1914, 
proposed the rehabilitation of Stalin for the fortieth anniversary of the 
party. Peterson also thought it necessary to refer to the Chinese views, 
‘What did the Chinese comrades say to us after the XX Party Congress: 
One must not allow the services of Stalin to be forgotten. ‘ As an example 
of party discipline,  Peterson does not oppose the criticism of  Stalin as 
such, ‘But the disaster is that such forms used at the XX Party Congress 
and later were chosen. With this kind of criticism we handed weapons into 
the hands of our enemies around the world, we gave them an opportunity 
to mock our country, our party, [and] Stalin (as the Yugoslavian renegades 
did).’13 The opinions expressed in the letter of three offi cers criticizing a 
lecture held in Leningrad are even harsher. The mocking of Stalin’s name 
was seen to have refl ected badly on the position of the whole party and 
to have served only the objectives of the imperialists. ‘And it must be 
said that the imperialist troubadours have managed to gain some success 
in this dirty business, to get themselves some moral capital, and to cause 
defeats to our general cause, the cause of communism.’14
One factor to these letters of the enlightened ‘rank and fi le’ have in 
common is that the international context is included in their evaluations of 
de-Stalinization. From the point of view of the legitimacy of the political 
system, it is interesting that the fi rst letter criticizes Stalin’s personal 
dictatorship, not the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, it 
criticizes Stalin’s crimes against the people, not just against the party.
THE GERMAN QUESTIONS
The conservatives in the CPSU leadership had been quite justifi ed in their 
concern during the spring of 1956 that the criticism of ‘the personality 
cult’ could extend outside the boundaries of the existing political system. 
Though related only to a minor Western communist party, the report to 
13 RGANI, Antonina Peterson’s letter to member of the Central Committee 
Shepilov, 11 Apr. 1957, 5/30/191.
14 RGANI, letter of Slomanskii, Makarov and Fazimiamekhtov to member of 
the Central Commitee of the CPSU Mikhail Suslov, 1 Apr .1957, 5/30/191.
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Shepilov, member of the CPSU Central Committee, from Pravda’s Bonn 
correspondent should offer some clues to these concerns.15 
To begin with, the West German Communist Party (GCP) was reported 
to have had problems since 1954. The authorities of the Federal Republic 
of Germany had banned the party, and its leadership had fl ed to East 
Berlin, losing touch with the party organisation. It was underlined that 
‘This kind of atmosphere of dissatisfaction prevailed towards the party 
leadership and towards communism before the reactions to the events 
of the 20th Party Congress.’ The GCP newspapers had avoided dealing 
with the diffi cult themes of de-Stalinization, ‘especially questions on 
the personality cult’, whereas the bourgeois German papers had taken 
advantage of the situation. 
This was, however only an introduction to the main substance of the 
report.  A sharp discussion had begun in the GCP after GDR leader  Walter 
Ulbricht’s article, which announced that  Stalin should not be regarded 
as one of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. The presentation of GCP 
chairman,  Max Reiman, did not help the situation either, as it had led 
to a ‘hostile and stormy reaction among the party masses.’ According to 
Neues Deutschland’s Bonn correspondence,  Dengler, the party activists 
were astonished at the fact ‘that Ulbricht and Reiman spoke of Stalin’s 
mistakes in such a manner as if though they themselves had not taken 
part in the personality cult.’ The person reading the report, apparently 
 Shepilov, had deemed this sentence worth underlining. Both Ulbricht and 
Reiman were, according to the report, still seen to ‘act like gods’, which 
the GCP offi cials could not accept ‘after what had been said about the 
personality cult in the 20th party congress of CPSU.’ However, Dengler 
claimed that according to his impression ‘CPSU’s and USSR’s authority 
had not been shaken’ among the West German communists. 
The last part of the report is based on an inside view of GCP by 
 Emil Karlbach from the international department of the GCP organ, 
Freies Volk. His following characterisation of the atmosphere in the GCP 
underlines again the signifi cance of de-Stalinization:   
15 The following presentation on German Communist Party is based on a report: 
RGANI,  P. Naumov to Dmitri Shepilov, memeber of the Central Commitee and 
editor-in-chief of Pravda, copy to Soviet ambassador in Bonn, Valentin Zorin, 25 
Apr. 1956, 5/30/174–178.
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Nowadays the personality cult and its consequences are at 
the centre of party life. The party leadership has attempted to 
direct the party organisation’s attention to other, more important 
questions, which were dealt with at the CPSU XX party congress, 
but in so far it has not succeeded [underlined up to this]. While 
exchanging opinions and during discussions, communists usually 
think like this: all that has been said at the CPSU party congress 
on the present international situation is good and right; many 
things had been clear to us earlier; but regarding the question 
of the personality cult there yet remains much [that is] unclear 
to us.
 Karlbach also repeated the distrust of the party ‘masses’ towards the 
leadership. According to the ‘masses’ the GCP party leadership should 
have been able to show through deeds, not through directives, their ability 
to lead. Since the ‘masses’ had also expressed interest in participating 
in the making and shaping of decisions. Together with these structural 
problems, the GCP chairman  Reiman had also committed a grave tactical 
mistake. He had admitted that the toppling of ‘the  Adenauer regime’ 
through revolutionary methods would be unlikely in the near future. 
This is commented on the following way: ‘With one sentence Reiman 
destroyed all that the party had been trained for many years, and he does 
not consider it necessary to clarify how to mend this dramatic mistake 
and its consequences.’ 
The prevailing mood in the GCP is summed up in very clear 
terms. Despite the claim that the prestige of the USSR is seen to have 
strengthened, as a consequence of 20th party congress:
West German communists want answers to two questions:
1) Why did the leaders of the CPSU not react against  Stalin’s 
personality cult at the time, and thus prevent many mistakes?
2) Where are the guarantees that the Soviet comrades will not err 
again, and bring their new mistakes to the fraternal parties?
From the viewpoint of the party-state’s legitimacy, these questions would 
continuously prove to be diffi cult ones to solve. 
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PRECEDENTS FOR PERESTROIKA:
FROM REFORM TO DEFENCE OF LEGITIMACY
The Perestroika policy offers an intriguing example of an attempt to 
revitalise a regime, while simultaneously deconstructing and rebuilding 
it. It is already well known how this attempt ended. However, it may 
be interesting to review some of the arguments that were supposed to 
support this endeavour in the beginning.
Generally,  Mikhail Gorbatchov’s reform policy can be divided into 
two phases. First, during 1985–1987 he aimed at reform within the limits 
of the existing political system, mainly by improving its effi ciency. 
This could be based on the example of the previous general secretary, 
 Juri Andropov. As this proved increasingly insuffi cient, after 1988 the 
perestroika policy came to mean defending the legitimacy of the Soviet 
regime, while restructuring it at the same time.16
The more open attitude to media and historical research, glasnost, 
had become also part of the reform policy; this led to the resurfacing of 
Stalinist ‘excesses in building socialism’. This meant that  Stalin and his 
methods could no longer be thought of as the only possible ones leading to 
the present modern stage of the Soviet society. During 1986  Gorbatchov 
had still accepted Stalinist means to justify the achieved results. However, 
after Stalinist methods begun to be seen as intolerable, the Soviet political 
system could be defended only by excluding Stalin from the regime. This 
meant that the perestroika policy needed to be founded on  Lenin, the 
creator of the revolution and the regime following it. In this situation 
Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP), a mixed economy, which followed 
the revolution and civil war in 1921, became the centre of attention in the 
late 1987. It presented an example of a former reform period aimed at 
correcting economic and systemic failures in the regime.17
The NEP of 1920s was the example for reform in the Soviet Union 
for another reason as well. Even though Gorbatchov was aware of, 
and appreciated, more recent Eastern European reform attempts from 
the1950s and 1960s, it would not have been possible to publicly borrow 
from their experience. Firstly, this was because from the ideological point 
16 O. J. Bandelin, Return to the NEP: The False Promise of Leninism and the 
Failure of Perestroika. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers 2002, 63–64.
17 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 101.
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of view their socialism was established later than the Soviet one and 
thus less mature. Secondly, and even more importantly, their attempts 
to reform socialism had been crushed by the military force of Soviet 
Union in 1956 and 1968, because these reforms had been seen as threats 
to the Soviet sphere of infl uence in Eastern Europe. Thus NEP became 
a promising example for perestroika, especially in economic terms. 
Politically, however, it included considerable risks, as it was connected 
to  Lenin’s late, but growing concerns over the failures of the political 
system he had created.18   
To better understand the potential and the pitfalls NEP presented 
as an argument for perestroika in the 1980s, it is useful to see how the 
offi cial interpretation of Soviet history had characterised it. According 
to the Short Study Course, NEP and the mixed economy it created 
was a necessary and successful solution initiated by Lenin to address 
the problems created by the civil war. Although it ideologically meant 
a temporary setback since private enterprise and land ownership were 
allowed on a limited basis, it would eventually pave the way to socialism 
by creating the wealth needed for the transformation of society. Within 
the party opposition to this policy was claimed to rise from its left and 
right wings. The left wing (‘trotskyites’) opposed the policy in the 
beginning, arguing that it was a retreat from socialism. The right wing 
(‘bukharinities’), on the other hand, opposed the end of the policy, siding 
with the peasants, especially when collectivisation of agriculture was put 
into effect in the late 1920s. 19  
As one of the most condemning accusations the Short Study Course 
claimed that the opposition, including in this case both the left and the 
right wing ‘did not believe in the possibility of socialist development 
in our country.’20 Also, in relation to the industrialisation programme it 
was observed that ‘ Zinovjev and  Kamenev already once dared declare 
that the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union is impossible because 
18 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 82, 92.
19 Lyhyt oppikurssi [Short Study Course], 287–289. The Short Study Course is 
not completely logical in the division between the ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ 
opposition in the Party regarding the NEP. On page 287 ‘Trotskyites’ are included 
in the left-wing, but on the page 289 Trotsky is connected to the right-wing. 
Apparently Trotsky and his supporters could be conveniently included in every 
possible deviation from the Party main line. 
20 Lyhyt oppikurssi [Short Study Course], 289.
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of the country’s economic backwardness, ...’ The arguments of  the 
‘zinovjevite’ opposition, fi rstly that Soviet state-owned industry was not 
socialist industry, and secondly, that the so-called mid peasant could not 
be an ally of the working class in building socialism, were specifi cally 
labelled as ‘anti-leninist’.21 This characterisation was meant to defi ne the 
arguments as absurdities, and not deserving an answer. However, when 
compared to what  Lenin actually wrote during his last active period after 
the beginning of the NEP at the turn of 1922–1923, it is obvious that this 
is not the case at all.
ANTI-LENINIST VIEWS OF LENIN
Several serious doubts concerning the Soviet political system had arisen 
in Lenin’s mind after initiating the NEP, and before he was completely 
incapacitated by strokes in the spring of 1923. The basis for these 
concerns had then been carefully hidden in the USSR. Lenin’s doubts, 
which he had earlier (c. 1905–1920) actively denied but then begun to 
reconsider, were connected to critical views of  Karl Marx and  Georgi 
Plekhanov, the founder of Marxism in Russia and former mentor of 
Lenin. At the heart of the matter was the question of the prerequisites 
for a socialist revolution in Russia, and about specifi c features which 
possibly differentiated Russia from Western Europe. 
When writing about the prospects of Russia, Marx had referred to 
a term called ‘Asiatic mode of production’, in which the term ‘Asian’ 
does not refer to race, but more generally to the geographic location. The 
term, already in use, was meant to describe mostly agrarian societies, 
where economic and political power depended on one key feature, for 
instance, a raw material or resource such as an irrigation network22. 
Because of this, later the concept has also been known later as ‘hydraulic 
despotism’. These conditions would demand a strongly centralised 
21 Lyhyt oppikurssi [Short Study Course], 308–310.
22 On the historical background of the concept from Enlightenment to Marx 
and Engels, see Anne M. Bailey and Joseph R. Llobera, ‘The AMP: Sources and 
Formation of the Concept’, in Anne M. Bailey and Joseph R. Llobera (eds ), The 
Asiatic Mode of Production: Science and Politcs. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul 1981, 18–36. 
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bureaucracy, and would give the ruler a disproportionally strong, despotic 
position. Examples mentioned are the ancient civilizations of the Nile 
and Mesopotamia; later, China and India are seen to mainly fall into this 
category. To Marx the Russian autocracy had some common traits with 
these societies. The main problem from the viewpoint of revolution was 
that according to  Marx these societies were extremely diffi cult to change 
or reform, except through external defeat. This is because they had a 
large, passive peasantry, a small and weak middle class and scarcely any 
proletariat as counter weights to the autocracy.23
Russian Marxists, including the Mensheviks and Socialist 
revolutionaries (SR), generally thought that before a socialist revolution, 
Russia needed to go through not only a bourgeois revolution but also 
the development of a bourgeois society.  Plekhanov warned in 1906 
and again in the autumn of 1917 that a premature attempt to carry out a 
revolution and construction of socialism in Russia would lead to ‘Asiatic 
restoration’, a resurfacing of the old, autocratic power structures under 
new names.  Lenin and the Bolsheviks denied this possibility passionately 
claiming that the phase of bourgeois society was possible to bypass in 
Russia and move directly to the construction of socialism. Regardless of 
the accuracy of the concept of ‘Asiatic mode of production’ / ‘hydraulic 
despotism’, or its applicability specifi cally in the case of Russia, the 
signifi cant thing is, that criticism based on it was taken seriously among 
the Russian revolutionaries, and eventually by Lenin as well.24
After having begun the NEP Lenin begun to seriously question 
whether a socialist economy and society had emerged in Russia, as had 
been claimed after the revolution. He now, in March 1923, observed that 
it would be a lengthy process, and ‘It would be most harmful to trust 
that we already know something, or that we even in some respect have 
enough material to create a really new machinery, which would really 
deserve to be called socialist, Soviet etc.’25 In any case, he considered it 
23 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 36–37, on the basis of K. Wittfogels, Oriental 
Despotism, 1957. On similar emphases in Russian pre-revolutionary society, 
based on the concept of ‘Patrimonialism’, see R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old 
Regime. Norwich: Harmondsworth 1979, 249.
24 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 37 – 38, see also Bailey and Llobera, ‘Editors 
Introduction’ in part 2, The Asiatic Mode of Production: Science and Politcs, 
49–51.
25 V. I. Lenin, Teokset, osa 31. [Complete Works of Lenin, vol. 31]. ‘Mielummin 
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necessary to allow the return of limited private enterprise to revitalise the 
economy. He also took great pains to argue, on what bases the alliance 
between the industrial proletariat and the mid peasants could be made to 
work. Regarding the general aspects of everyday life,  Lenin stated ‘We 
have destroyed capitalist industry, we have tried [emphasis added] to 
destroy medieval institutions of manorialism down to its foundations….’ 
As a consequence of this, a small and split landowning peasantry had 
emerged, which it was claimed, followed the proletariat on the basis 
of the trust it felt towards the results of the revolution. This vital trust, 
however, could not be easily maintained.26
Together with the improvement of economic effi ciency, the NEP was 
meant to improve the quality of administration. State administration, by 
and large, was characterised as having ‘some new colour on the surface, 
but otherwise it was a most typical reminder of our old state machinery.’27 
The criticism of ‘bureaucratism’ regarding the party was brought up, 
meaning the strongly developed position of the party organisation. 
Lenin’s chief concern was now that especially the party administration 
was distancing itself from its members, and as such, its uncontrolled, 
autocratic, power could potentially be turned against even the ‘good 
communists’. However, Lenin’s solution to ‘bureucratism’ was to create 
new administrative organs, such as the Central Control Committee and 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection Committee. They were allowed special 
prerogatives. Careful selection of the personnel to these new organs was 
to guarantee their functioning.28
In regard to pre-revolutionary Marxist criticism concerning a prema-
ture revolution and its consequences in Russia, Lenin comes perhaps 
closest to admitting its relevancy when he characterises relations between 
workers and peasants, and evaluates, once again, the state administration. 
vähemmän mutta parempaa’ [’Rather less, but better’]. Moskova: Vieraskielisen 
kirjallisuuden kustannusliike 1962, 478.
26 Lenin, ‘Mielummin vähemmän mutta parempaa’[’Rather less, but better’], 
488.
27 Lenin, ‘Miten meidän olisi uudelleen järjestettävä työläis- ja talonpoi-
kaisinspektio’ [How we should rearrange worker and peasant inspection] in 
Teokset, osa 31, [Complete Works of Lenin, vol. 31], 471.
28 Lenin, ‘Miten meidän olisi uudelleen järjestettävä työläis- ja talonpoi-
kaisinspektio’ [How we should rearrange worker and peasant inspection], 474–
475.
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While the workers need to maintain their leading position, and the trust 
of the peasants, they, ‘following the greatest of thrift, have to expel from 
their social relations all the traits of excesses.’ The theme of ‘economising’ 
in social relations continued, with the admonition that:
We have to reach the greatest of thrift in our state machinery. We 
need to expel from it all the traits of excesses, of which so many 
have remained from Tsarist Russia, its bureaucratic and capitalist 
machinery.29  
As the two articles cited were among the last  Lenin wrote and published 
in the early spring of 1923, it becomes clear that NEP had not solved 
the post-revolutionary problems regarding the economy and the party-
state, political system of the Soviet Union. According to Lenin’s fi nal 
evaluation, it was a compromise, unfi nished at its best. It would seem, at 
the very least, that in Lenin’s mind something akin to ‘Asiatic restoration’ 
needed to be fought against in Soviet Russia, even if he avoided using 
the term.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMENTS
As these views became better known in the Soviet Union as a consequence 
of glansnost, the  NEP as an argument for  Gorbatchov’s perestroika 
policy, and indeed as defence for the legitimacy of the Soviet regime, 
would become increasingly questionable. The East European criticism 
of the Soviet system had a similar infl uence. 
During the 1960s the Czechoslovakian reform movement, culminating 
in the Prague spring, had underlined the importance of the rule of law and 
civil rights if a truly democratic and functional socialist society was to be 
achieved. The very foundation of the party-state, the arbitrary position of 
the Communist party based on its claimed representation of the working 
class, was strongly criticised. These views were presented in  Zdnek 
Mlynar’s book State and Man, as early as 1964. This in fact questioned 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, though in Mlynar’s mind, the party’s 
duty would be to uphold the rule of law and genuine constitutionalism. 
29 Lenin, ‘Mielummin vähemmän mutta parempaa’[’Rather less, but better’], 
491. 
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Generally, Czechoslovak intellectuals characterised the Soviet-type 
command economy as ‘Asian’, and a ‘return to Europe’ was seen as 
necessary if socialism was to prove viable in Czechoslovakia. 
In Poland, the ‘bureaucratic’ nature of Soviet socialism was openly 
criticised by  Jacek Kuron and  Karol Modzelewski in 1965 in their ‘Open 
Letter to the Party Members’. They named the Poznan worker uprising 
of 1956 as the ‘fi rst anti-bureaucratic revolution’ in Poland. Though the 
USSR would be an opponent in this struggle, the Russian and Ukrainian 
working classes were recognised as allies. After 1956 the stifl ing effects 
of Soviet socialism were seen to have increased, and a continuous 
struggle against it was called for.30  Polish intellectual criticism of the 
socialist system increased in March 1968, but it lacked worker support. 
In December 1970, on the other hand, the workers went on strike in 
Poland as response to rising prices, but did not receive support from the 
intellectuals. The two groups fi nally cooperated in March 1976, and the 
KOR (Committee for the  Defence of Workers) was formed. The KOR 
was the basis from which a better known independent and non-communist 
labour union, Solidarity, would rise in 1980,31 and shake Poland and the 
whole Socialist camp by actually challenging the ruling position of the 
Communist party in the society. 
This kind of development eventually could not be allowed to go on 
in the Soviet Union, even in the framework of perestroika and glasnost. 
Despite  Gorbatchov’s sincere interest in reforms and democratisation 
of Soviet society, he aimed to revitalise socialism, and this included 
the political monopoly of the Communist party. Thus, history political 
decision to use the NEP as an argument to support perestroika changed 
from potential to risk from the viewpoint of the legitimacy of the party-
state.  Lenin’s concerns related to it became well known, to the public, 
and the growing East European protest movements had adopted these 
same doubts as the foundation for their struggle. 
30 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 88–89.
31 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 87–88.
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IN THE DEFENCE OF SOVIET LEGITIMACY
The interdependence between political system, ideology and historical 
research in the Soviet Union is not extraordinary as such. The one-party 
system merely gave these relationships their unique features. However, it 
might also be interesting examine the relationship of historical research 
and politics in present day Russia. The resurgence of the country seems 
to be based on an energy related raw material cycle resembling some 
aspects of hydraulic despotism, and the re-emergence of state sponsored 
youth organisations, carrying president  Putin’s face on their shirts.  
An examination of the three history political cases: Bolshevik rise to 
power, the comments of Communist party members on de-Stalinisation, 
and the NEP-policy as a precedent for Perestroika, makes it possible to 
outline some practical aspects in this relationship. These cases, especially 
the fi rst and the third, allow for the observation of Marxist-Leninism’s 
consistency, or lack of it, as an ideology aiming to achieve power and 
maintain it, on the basis of its own values. The Bolshevik reactions to 
the ‘German connection’ proved their vulnerability to accusations of 
betraying the nation, both when aiming at power in 1917 and when 
consolidating their position in the late 1930s. This would mean that even 
an internationalist party could not risk being regarded as openly acting 
against the nation, however defi ned, in whose name it claimed to assume 
state power and establish a new society.  On this basis nationalism was a 
much stronger, though latent, component of Bolshevik and, later, Soviet 
legitimacy than would seem on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
When evaluating the signifi cance of NEP policy in the 1920s as a 
precedent or an argument for Perestroika,  Lenin’s late doubts over the 
political system he had created can also be examined from the viewpoint 
of the values of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Lenin’s concern at the turn 
of 1922–1923 about the emergence of new powerful party bureaucracy 
and old, imperial administrative methods fi ts the context of Marxist 
discussion on ‘Asiatic mode of production’, which in Russia specifi cally 
was connected to the prerequisites of socialist revolution. Within this 
discussion ‘Asiatic restoration’ was the term which described the 
resurfacing of old power structures. This could take place if a socialist 
revolution was begun before the development of a proper bourgeois 
society.  
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Lenin’s implicit agreement that something like ‘Asiatic restoration’ 
needed to be resisted in Soviet Russia opened two themes for 
reconsideration: Firstly, should a revolution aiming at socialism in Russia 
have been realized the way it was, and secondly, once done, could the 
revolutionary regime succeed in creating a socialist society.  
These themes could be quite unsettling from the viewpoint of the new 
regime, and the Soviet mainstream history did not favour interpretations 
based on an Asiatic mode of production even during 1920s32. These 
mainstream interpretations were but one example in, which  Lenin also 
was canonized for the needs of Soviet legitimacy. However, from the 
viewpoint of present day historiography, the questions also offer a way 
to avoid teleology based on the collapse of the Soviet Union and to see 
alternative paths of historical change. If the regime created in Russia 
after the 1917 revolution was not socialist by Marxist defi nition, then 
it is possible to think that a socialist society would have been different 
from the Soviet party-state experience. Also, consequently, collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 can be differentiated from collapse or survival 
of socialism as an ideology. 
In terms of the questions presented at the beginning concerning history 
political relations, it is clear that a major shift had occurred between the 
presentation of the Bolshevik rise to power in the Short Study Course, 
originally in 1938, and the fi rst effects of de-Stalinization. Such canonised 
interpretations as presented in the Stalinist Short Study Course, would 
simply not be credible after  Khruschchev’s ‘secret speech’ in early 1956. 
The admission of and aim to correct one’s own mistakes was thought 
as a resource for increasing the legitimacy of the Soviet regime both 
among its own citizens and abroad.  However, as a consequence, the 
CPSU had irreversibly lost the status of infallibility, which meant that the 
party’s leading position both in the Soviet society and in the international 
communist movement could be challenged from now on.
Mihail  Gorbachov’s reform policy from the mid 1980s onwards 
meant the next qualitative change had taken place. After expansion of the 
reform programme from economic effi ciency to thorough reform of the 
political system, exclusion of  Stalin from the regime was required, as was 
focusing on Lenin and his policies, especially the NEP, as the foundation 
32 On Soviet history debates during 1920’s and 1930’s, Bailey and Llobera, 
‘Editors Introduction’, 51–52.
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of the regime. In fact, the fi rst step on the road to this direction was 
taken when Stalin’s crimes were exposed in 1956 by Khrushchev. Now 
it became clear that Lenin had decisively infl uenced the formation of 
coercive policies and organisations of the party. When he fi nally doubted 
their expediency, but did not fi nd any practical solutions, this meant the 
beginning of the end from the viewpoint of legitimacy. Though Stalin 
had come to the leadership of the party after Lenin, his policies could not 
be excluded from  Lenin’s principles. When this kind of interpretation of 
history began to spread and became popular in the Soviet Union, there 
was little left on which to build the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. For 
without Lenin, there would probably not have been an October-type 
revolution in Russia, and without it, no Soviet Union to defend.   
